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I. INTRODUCTION
'Theprotection of our intellectualproperty is an obsession with me. Because if
we invent it, and all that goes into it, that's how we're going to compete in the
world."
Sen. Barbara Mikulski'
As the gatekeeper for domestic patent rights, the United States Patent and
Trademark Office (PTO)2 is an important catalyst for economic growth in the
United States. In an effort to improve patent quality and streamline the patent
process in the twenty-first century, the PTO recently developed policy initiatives
and rules that limit the number of claims an applicant can file.4 Although well
intentioned, these new provisions hinder an applicant's ability to obtain patent
protection for the full scope of his or her invention.' Thus, any rule changes
intended to increase PTO efficiency need to be carefully balanced against the
negative impact such rules might have on innovation.6
For today's businesses, success depends on intangible information-based
industries which now represent major aspects of the American economic
landscape.7 These industries require constant innovation in order to maintain
' Commerce, Justice, Sc, and Related Appropriations Agencies for Fiscal Year 2008 Hearing of the
Commerce, Justice, and Sc. Subcomm. ofthe S. Appropriations Comm., 110th Cong. 48 (2007) (statement of
Sen. Barbara Mikulski, Chair, Subcomm. on Commerce, Justice, Sci., and Related Agencies).
2 The provisions of the patents laws are laid out in Tide 35 of the United States Code and give
authority for the PTO to examine and grant patents. See 35 U.S.C. 55 1-376 (2000).
' Alfonso G. Chan, A Proposed Defense to Patent Infringement, 1999 CoMP. L. REV. & TECH.
J. 79, 79 (1999).
4 See U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, 2007-2012 STRATEGIC PLAN 32-33 (2007)
[hereinafter STRATEGIC PLAN], availaeathttp://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/strat2007/strat
plan2007-2012.pdf (listing twenty-six action initiatives comprising the five-year plan); Changes to
Practice for Continued Examination Filings, Patent Applications Containing Patentably Indistinct
Claims, and Examination of Claims in Patent Applications, 72 Fed. Reg. 46,716 (Aug. 21, 2007) (to
be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1) (revising rules of practice in examination of claims in patent
applications); discussion infra Part III.A (discussing effect of new rules on strategic claiming
practices).
5 See infra Part III.A.
6 See FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, To PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF
COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY ch. 3 at 11 n.48 (2003), availabk at http://www.ftc.
gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf (noting that some experts believe that without patent
protection, innovation in the pharmaceutical industry would increase approximately 60/0).
7 See WESTON ANSON ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY VALUATION:
A PRIMER FOR IDENTIFYING AND DETERMINING VALUE 234 (2006) ("In the case of Microsoft, the
value of its intangible assets and intellectual property is more than 90%; for Merck it is 809/6 of the
total capitalization.').
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their position in a world market where technologic knowledge increases
exponentially.8 The necessity of a patent system has been obvious to Americans
since the founding of our country.' Since that time, the ingenuity of American
inventors, coupled with a patent system that encourages and rewards innovation,
has transformed America into the world's preeminent technological and economic
nation. ° Modern patent protections provide an environment in which a patentee
can profit from his invention free from competition. 1 This promotes economic
vitality through investment, research, scientific development, and the
commercialization of new inventions. 2 In exchange for this protection, the
See Gordon E. Moore, Cramming More Components onto Integrated Circuits, 38 ELECTRONICS 8
(1965), availabk athttp://download.intel.com/research/silicon/moorespaper.pdf ("The complexity
for minimum component costs has increased at a rate of roughly a factor of two per year ...
Certainly over the short term this rate can be expected to continue, if not to increase. Over the
longer term, the rate of increase is a bit more uncertain, although there is no reason to believe it will
not remain nearly constant for at least 10 years."); Ray Kurzweil, The Law of Accekrating Returns,
Mar. 7,2001, http://www.kurzweilai.net/articles/artOl34.html.printable=l ("It is important to note
that Moore's Law of Integrated Circuits was not the first, but the fifth paradigm to provide
accelerating price-performance. Computing devices have been consistently multiplying in power (per
unit of time) from the mechanical calculating devices used in the 1890 U.S. Census, to Turing's relay-
based 'Robinson' machine that cracked the Nazi enigma code, to the CBS vacuum tube computer
that predicted the election of Eisenhower, to the transistor-based machines used in the first space
launches, to the integrated-circuit-based personal computer.... ''.
' More than 200 years ago, the need for a patent system was addressed in the Constitution. U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (declaring Congress's power to "promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries").
10 The United States ranked first in a recent global economic competitiveness report. See
WORLD ECON. FORUM, THE GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS REPORT 2007-2008, at 10, 12 (2007)
(concluding that the United States is the world's most competitive economy given its combination
of highly innovative and sophisticated companies, efficient financial markets, high university
enrollment, and strong intellectual property protection); Richard M. Jones, Competiiveness Index:
W here America Stands, FYI: THE AIP BULLETIN OF SCIENCE POLICY NEWS, Jan. 24, 2007, hrtp://
www.aip.org/fyi/2007/01 1.html (noting that the Council on Competitiveness has determined that
sixteen of the top twenty-five most innovative companies in the world are American companies).
With that said, several macroeconomic imbalances and repeated fiscal deficits threaten the economic
competitive edge that the United States has over other countries. World Economic Forum,
at 12-13.
" A patent grants the patentee the "right to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale,
or selling the invention throughout the United States or importing the invention into the United
States...." 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2000). See also Robert E. Thomas, Vanquishing Copyright Pirates and
Patent Trolls: The Divergent Evolution of Copyright and Patent Laws, 43 AM. Bus. L.J. 689, 694 (2006)
('Without the potential to at least recover development costs, an inventor may not attract sufficient
financing or be willing to invest the resources needed to complete the project.").
12 See ROGER SCHECHTER &JOHN THOMAS, PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW § 1.3.1, at 9-12 (2d
ed. 2004) (introducing patent policy).
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inventor discloses his invention to the public and society benefits from the
increased availability of information in the public domain. 13
Such a system potentially reduces social benefits through transfer of wealth
from consumers to producers by increasing prices from competitive to monopoly
level14 and inhibiting the use of scientific or technological knowledge for further
research.'5 Yet, patent protection seeks to minimize these effects through various
legal mechanisms. In order for an invention to be patentable, it must be novel,
useful, and non-obvious. 6 Additionally, a patent is granted only for a term
"beginning on the date on which the patent issues and ending 20 years from the
date on which the application for the patent was filed."" This essential system
is regulated by a complex code of action that inventors must obey in order to
obtain patent protection. 8 Because the PTO promulgates this code, 9 every
inventor and thus the economy to which they contribute is dependent on the
efficacy of the rules.
This Note considers the claims limitation aspect of the new rules in the
context of economic valuation of intellectual property and appropriate motivation
for innovation. Part II examines the provisions of the new rules and the policies
the PTO is attempting to further with their promulgation. Part III demonstrates
the practical realities of patent prosecution and the detrimental impact a delayed
or ineffective patent prosecution system will have on the United States economy,
both domestically and abroad. More specifically, this Part addresses the particular
patent valuation factors which disparately impact industries and applicants
especially vital to domestic innovation and prosperity. Additionally, Part III
" See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000) (describing the "full and clear disclosure" required to obtain a valid
patent); MANUALOF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2162 (8th ed., rev. 6,2007) (explaining that
"the patentee must disclose in the patent sufficient information to put the public in possession of
the invention and to enable those skilled in the art to make and use the invention" and that the
patent disclosure requirement allows the information contained in the patent to become "a part of
the information available to the public for further research and development").
14 See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 276, 279-80 (6th ed. 2003)
(efficiency consequences of monopoly); Kenneth W. Dam, The Economic Underpinnings of Patent
Law, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 247, 250 (1994) ("Economic rents are common in the economy. They are
enjoyed wherever an economic actor has a cost advantage that competitors cannot match, for legal
or other reasons."); see also SUZANNE SCOTCHMER, INNOVATION AND INCENTIVES 97-112 (2004)
(discussing intellectual property as an incentive mechanism).
's See Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Compkx Economics ofPatentSope, 90 COLUM.
L. REV. 839, 870 (1990) ('Since some of the follow-on efforts of inventors could result in something
not simply slightly different but significantly better than the patented technology, broad patents
could discourage much useful research.").
16 See 35 U.S.C. § 101-103 (2000) (statutory criteria for patentable inventions).
'7 Id § 154(a)(2).
1' See id. % 111-122 (patent application requirements).
19 See ido % 1-13 (establishment of the PTO).
[Vol. 15:343
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presents alternatives available to the PTO to relieve the currently overwhelming
application backlog with a focus on improving administrative factors rather than
altering a functioning patent system. This Note concludes that claim limitation
rule changes, such as those proposed by the PTO, will inhibit patent applicants
from obtaining comprehensive patent protection and negatively impact
innovation vital to the American economy.
II. BACKGROUND
To address the growing problems in the PTO, this Part will begin by providing
a brief overview of the patent prosecution process in general. Next, the
administrative difficulties being faced by the PTO, the primary causes of these
difficulties, and the solutions to these difficulties proposed by the PTO will be
discussed. This Part will also describe the particular economic and innovative
consequences arising from such proposed solutions.
A. NUTS AND BOLTS OF OBTAINING A PATENT
Before issuing as an enforceable patent, each application must go through an
extensive examination process, known as "prosecution."2 This process includes
review of the application's disclosure and a search of a large body of relevant
technological information, known as "prior art,"'" by trained personnel at the
PTO, known as examiners, to determine whether each claim is patentable.' To
obtain a patent, an applicant must provide a written description of the invention
in sufficient detail for a person skilled in the relevant area of technology to make
and use the invention.23 In addition, the applicant must provide one or more
claims that define what the applicant regards as his or her invention. 4 A claim,
unlike the written description, is designed to provide public notice of precisely
what the patent owner has a right to exclude others from making, using, or
selling.
25
2o See SCHECHTER & THOMAS, supra note 12, § 7.2, at 222-34 (introduction and mechanics of
patent prosecution); see also Raymond Van Dyke, E Wars - Episode One: The Patent Menace, 6 CoMP.
L. REV. &TECH.J. 1, 17 (2001) (checklist for obtaining a patent).
21 Prior art constitutes all information that has been made available to the public that might be
relevant to a patent claim's novelty or nonobviousness. See SCHECHTER & THOMAS, spra note 12,
§ 4.3-4.4, at 85-141, § 5.2, at 145-51.
22 Id § 7.2.3, at 225-27.
23 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000).
24 Id
25 SCHECHTER & THOMAS, spra note 12, § 6.2, at 200.
20081
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A patent's claims are the most critical elements of the application because they
define the metes and bounds of protection.26 A fundamental goal of claim
drafting is to encompass all possible embodiments of the invention disclosed in
the specification because any embodiment not claimed is dedicated to the public
and cannot be recovered by the applicant.27 Adequate protection of patent
validity in the litigation context requires presenting claims in many statutory
classes, as different types of claims provide for a different scope of protection,
apply against different parties, and have different defenses.28 For example, on a
basic level, a new chemical compound can often be patented through claims
directed to methods of using the composition and methods of making the
composition. 29 Even within one statutory class, the applicant will need to present
a claim set varying from broad to narrow.30 Narrow claims increase the likelihood
of validity if new prior art is discovered, while broad claims increase likelihood
that attempts to design around will fail.
31
If the PTO believes the application fulfills the statutory patentability
requirements, it will allow the application to issue as a granted patent.32 Yet, in
over 80% of cases, the examiner rejects claims as unpatentable in the first
communication to the applicant,33 known as a "first office action," 34 and provides
26 See 37 C.F.R. § 1.75(a) (2007) ("The specification must conclude with a claim particularly
pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention
or discovery."); Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 510 (1917)
("The scope of every patent is limited to the invention described in the claims contained in it, read
in the light of the specification. These so mark where the progress claimed by the patent begins and
where it ends that they have been aptly likened to the description in a deed, which sets the bounds
to the grant which it contains.").
27 JEFFREY G. SHELDON, HOW TO WRITE A PATENT APPLICATION § 6.5.1 (2007).
28 See general# M. HENRY HEINES, PATENT EMPOWERMENT FOR SMALL CORPORATIONS 47
(2001) (suggesting successful patent enforcement requires creativity in drafting claims); ROBERT C.
FABER, LANDIS ON MECHANICS OF PATENT CLAIM DRAFTING § 7:2 (5th ed. 2007) ("For fullest
protection wherever an invention is capable of being claimed in more than one of the different ways,
it is recommended that that be done.').
29 See SHELDON, supra note 27, § 6.5.4 (explaining the significant advantages associated with
method claims as compared to other types of claims).
30 See SCHECHTER & THOMAS, supra note 12, § 6.2.2.1, at 206 (discussing how patent applicants
should use dependent claims to narrow a claim when necessary). In general, a narrow claim specifies
more detail than a broad claim. Broad claims encompass more "intellectual territory" and are more
vulnerable to invalidation. GREGORY A. STOBBS, BUSINESS METHOD PATENTS 489 (2003).
3' SCHECHTER & THOMAS, supra note 12, § 6.2.2.1, at 206.
32 35 U.S.C. § 151 (2000).
3 K. Matthew Dames, The Patent System on Tilt: IBM Seeks to Change the Game, INFO. TODAY,
Oct. 16,2006, availableathttp://newsbreaks.infotoday.com/nbreader.asp?ArticlelD 18422 (quoting
Brigid Quinn, deputy director of the PTO's public affairs office, stating that "80% of all applications
are rejected after the initial review").
34 See DONALD S. CHISLM ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 104-15
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the applicant with a detailed explanation of how the claims lack patentability.3"
In response to an initial rejection, the applicant may amend the claim or present
reasons why the rejection is improper.36 If the claims are still found unpatentable
after reevaluation by the examiner, the rejection is made final and prosecution is
closed.37 Though some patents issue in less than a year and others can take
decades to issue, 38 applicants must wait almost two years on average for a first
office action and almost another year after that for the prosecution to be closed.39
Such an extended examination process is due to many intermingled factors, the
most apparent being the number of applications flooding the PTO each year.4°
B. AGENCY IN DISTRESS: CURING AN AILING PATENT OFFICE
The PTO is facing a crisis of numbers: in excess of 440,000 patent
applications were filed in the 2006 fiscal year;41 more than doubling the number
filed ten years before.42 While this would seem to be good news for innovation,43
(3d ed. 2004) (discussing the formalities of patent prosecution).
M 37 C.F.R. § 1.104(c) (2007).
16 Id. §1.111(b).
37 Id. §1.113.
31 See Mark A. Lemley & Kimberly A. Moore, Ending Abuse of Patent Continuations, 84 B.U. L.
REV. 63, 71-72 (2004) (describing the distribution of prosecution time including a patent with a total
prosecution time of more than forty-four years).
39 See U.S. PATENT ANDTRADEMARK OFFICE, PERFORMANCEAND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT:
FISCAL YEAR 2006, at 123 (2006), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/annual/
2006/2006annualreport.pdf (describing pendency statistics by technology center).
o See Brian E. Mack, PTO Rulemaking in the Tweny-flrst Century: Defining the Line Between Strategic
Planning andAbuse ofAuthortiy, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2105,2106 (2007) (discussing how the dramatic
increase in U.S. patent applications in recent years has created a substantial backlog of unexamined
patent applications).
41 The PTO fiscal year ends on September 30th. 31 U.S.C. § 1102 (2000).
42 See U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. PATENT STATISTICS, CALENDAR
YEARS 1963-2006(2007), availabk athttp://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/usstat.
pdf (demonstrating that the number of patent applications and patent grants have increased by
approximately 114% and 6 1%, respectively, in the past ten years).
43 Patent grant rate has often been linked to intellectual progress and development. See
ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, PATENTS AND
INNOVATION: TRENDS AND POLICY CHALLENGES 5 (2004), available at http://www.oecd.org/data
oecd/48/12/24508541.pdf ("The increasing use of patents to protect inventions by businesses and
public research organisations is closely connected to recent evolutions in innovation processes, the
economy and patent regimes."). ButseeJames E. Bessen & Eric Maskin, SequentialInnovation, Patents,
and Imitation (MIT Dep't of Econ., Working Paper No. 00-01, 2000), available at http://papers.ssm.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=206189 (discussing how patent protection may reduce overall
innovation and social welfare in dynamic industries, such as software); PaulJ. Heald, A Transaction
Costs Theory of Patent Law, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 473, 505-06 (2005) ("It is plausible that patenting
increased after 1982 because the patent system became more reliable, and therefore more likely to
7
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given the increased application rates, it is reasonable to expect future application
filings to increase by 36,000 applications each year.44 Countries with a higher
growth rate tend to receive more patent applications, so the substantial increase
in U.S. patent filing should be viewed as a positive economic indicator of the
innovation in the diverse domestic economy.4 . In addition to an increased
number of patent applications, the average time required to process an application
has grown to over two and a half years.'
Notably, from an efficiency standpoint, of the nearly half a million patent
applications received by the PTO annually, less than 200,000 actually issue as
patents. 47 Because not all applications result in issued patents," the dramatic
increase in application filings has caused the number of pending patent
applications to more than double in the past five years.49 Over 700,000 of the
1,000,000 applications pending at the end of 2006 had not even received a first
confer... benefits and cost reductions...
44 See U.S. PATENT STATISTICS, CALENDAR YEARS 1963-2006, supra note 42 (showing that
from 2003-2004, 2004-2005, and 2005-2006, the number of patent applications filed increased
by 26,096, 25,369, and 35,125 applications respectively).
45 BISWAJIT DHAR & C. NIRANJAN RAO, WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION,
INTERNATIONAL PATENT SYSTEM: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 50 (2002), available at http://www.
wipo.int/about-ip/en/studies/pdf/study b_dar.pdf.
4 See John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, The Growing Compexify of the United States Patent
System, 82 B.U. L. REV. 77, 98 (2002) (noting that patents in 1976-78 sample averaged 2.23 years in
prosecution as compared to 2.77 years in prosecution for the 1996-98 sample).
47 U.S. PATENT STATISTICS, CALENDAR YEARS 1963-2006, supra note 42. Yet, the utility of
relying on published patent grant rates when making patent reform decisions is questionable due to
difficulties in calculating patent grants rates. See Ron D. Katznelson, Bad Sdence in Search of 'Bad"
Patents, 17 FED. CIR. B.J. 1 (2007/2008) (discussing complications involved in grant rate calculation);
Mark A. Lemley & Bhaven N. Sampat, Is the Patent Office a Rubber Stamp? 4-9 (Stanford Public
Law Working Paper No. 999098, 2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abst
ractid=999098 (identifying data controversies in calculating patent grant rates).
8 Since 2002, approximately forty to fifty percent of patent applications have resulted in issued
patents. See PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT FISCAL YEAR 2006, supra note 39,
at 120 (reporting patent applications which were either abandoned or received first office actions
in 2006). Applications that do not result in issued patents are either abandoned or pending before
an examiner. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PATENTS: INFORMATION ABOUT THE
PUBLICATION PROVISIONS OFTHE AMERICAN INVENTORS PROTECTION AcT 12-13 (2004), available
at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04603.pdf (discussing patent status as issued, abandoned, or
pending). Applications may be abandoned by express request of the applicant or failure to reply in
a timely and sufficient matter. See MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 711.01-.02(c)
(explaining patent prosecution abandonment procedure).
49 Compare PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT FISCAL YEAR 2006, supra note 39,
at 124 (reporting 1,077,042 patent applications pending at the end of fiscal year 2006), with U.S.
PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT FISCAL
YEAR 2001, at 110 (2001), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/annual/2001/01
performreport.pdf (reporting 613,173 patent applications pending at the end of fiscal year 2001).
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office action.50 Increased delay in patent prosecution means a shorter period of
protection for applicants, especially since the patent term is measured from the
filing date rather than issue date.' Additionally, the uncertainty of not knowing
the full scope of the invention until years later when the patent issues withholds
a social benefit because it prevents fully informed market decisions by both the
inventor and competitors during the pendency period. 2
For several years, the PTO has been struggling to reduce its backlog of
applications that have not been examined. 3 In response, the PTO developed
the 21st Century Strategic Plan,5 4 which included several initiatives targeted
toward timeliness, increased technology use, and employee training.5 Pursuant
to this plan, a record 1,218 patent examiners were hired in 2006.56 While this
resulted in a record number of reviewed patent applications that year, the
percentage of applications reviewed by examiners that were ultimately approved
in 2006 reached a record low." Even if annual hiring goals are met, an
estimated 800,000 patent applications will be awaiting a first office action by the
end of 2007,58 and it is projected that 1.4 million patent applications will be
pending a first office action by 2012." Since the volume of patent applications
will continue to exceed the PTO's capacity to timely examine them 60 the United
'o PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABIUTY REPORT FIsCAL YEAR 2006, supra note 39, at 122.
51 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2000) (providing term of patent protection begins on date of grant and
ends twenty years from filing date of application); see also Kristen Osenga, Entrance Raups, Tolls,
and Express Lanes - Proposals for Decreasing Traffic Congestion in the Patent Office, 33 FLA. ST. U. L.
REv. 119, 127-28 (2005) ("Thus, the period between the date an application is filed and the date the
patent ultimately issues is essentially a dead period for the patentee, regardless of the invention's
intended usage. An extended dead period shortens the available 'live' period for the patent.").
52 See Osenga, supra note 51, at 120-21 (discussing some of the private and social losses caused
by speed and quality problems present in the PTO).
5' See John Doll, USPTO Acting Commissioner for Patents, 2005 Patent Practice Update at
National Association of Patent Practitioners Meeting (July 19, 2005), http://www.napp.org/D011
_Presentation.ppt (discussing 2004 pendency rates in the USPTO).
54 STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 4, at 6.
s- UnitedStates Patent and Trademark ModernizationAct of2003: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Courts,
the Internet and Intellectual Property, 108th Cong. 61 (2003) (statement of James E. Rogan, Director,
United States Patent and Trademark Office); see also STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 4, at 32-34 (listing
the initiatives of the PTO's 21st Century Strategic Plan).
56 Press Release, U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, Fiscal Year 2006: A Record-Breaking Year
for the USPTO (Dec. 22,2006), available athttp://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/speeches/06-
73.htm (reporting record-breaking numbers related to 2006 hiring goals).
" Press Release, U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, Deputy Under Secretary of Commerce
Announces FY 2008 Budget Proposal for USPTO (Feb. 5,2007), available athttp://www.uspto.gov/
web/offices/com/speeches/07-09.htm.
" Erik Sherman, Patent Pol'tics, IP LAW & BUSINESS, Aug. 2007, at 44.
59 STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 4, at 11.
o See Stephen Becker, Patent Pileup: The Patent Office Can't Clear Its Backlog by Shifting Work to
2008]
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States Government Accountability Office believes that the PTO must drastically
increase reform efforts, beyond hiring, to reduce the backlog.6'
C. 37 C.F.R. 1.75(B) AND THE CLAIM LIMITATION RULE CHANGES
The PTO is authorized to establish regulations to govern operations within
the office in order to facilitate and expedite the processing of patent
applications.62 In January 2006, the PTO exercised this authority and proposed
to revise the rules of practice relating to the examination of claims in patent
applications in order to make the process more effective and efficient. 63 The
original proposal sought stringent limitations on claims, 64 but the proposal was
modified in response to several hearings and extensive public commentary. 5
Inventors, LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 3, 2006, at 58 ("In recent town-hall meetings, John Doll, the
commissioner for patents, unveiled a plan to hire 1,000 additional examiners, who would then be
trained for eight months in a new academy. However, the PTO has calculated that even this effort
would barely make a dent in the backlog and quality problems. . . '!). But see Steven J. Moore,
Hampering Ingenuity Through Changes in the Rules; The New USPTO Proposed Regulations, INTELL. PROP.
TODAY, Apr. 2006, at 33 (referring to USPTO claims that increased hiring alone will not reduce the
backlog as "sheer poppycock").
61 See U.S. GOv'T ACCOUNTABILrrY OFFICE (GAO), U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE:
HIRING EFFORTS ARE NOT SUFFICIENT TO REDUCE THE PATENT APPLICATION BACKLOG 1-23
(2007), available athttp://www.gao.gov/new.items/d071102.pdf (analyzing effect of patent examiner
hiring and attrition rates on growing backlog of unexamined patents). In response to the GAO
report, the PTO plans to review current production goals to "encourage a completely fresh look at
production in a manner that will motivate employees, improve its work environment, and enhance
the quality and efficiency of the patent examination process." Press Release, U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office, USPTO Will Begin Study of Patent Examiners' Production Goals (Oct. 4,2007),
available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/speeches/07-42.htm.
62 See 35 U.S.C. S 2(b) (2000) (specific powers of PTO). But see Tafas v. Dudas, No 1:07cv846
(JCC), 2008 WL 859467 (E.D. Va. Apr. 1, 2008) (finding the PTO Rule-making Authority is limited
to procedural changes, whereas the claim limitation rule discussed here is substantive).
63 Press Release, U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, USPTO Proposes Measures To Improve
Patent Examination (Jan. 3,2006), available athttp://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/speeches/
06-01.htm.
' See Changes to Practice for the Examination of Claims in Patent Applications, 71 Fed.
Reg. 61-01 (Jan. 3, 2006) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1) (proposing initial examination of only
representative claims expressly designated by applicant for initial examination); Changes To Practice
for Continuing Applications, Requests for Continued Examination Practice, and Applications
Containing Patentably Indistinct Claims, 71 Fed. Reg. 48 (Jan. 3,2006) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R.
pt. 1) (requiring that second or subsequent continued examination filings be supported by a showing
as to why the amendment, argument, or evidence presented could not have been previously
submitted and that all patentably indistinct claims be submitted in a single application).
6' The National Association of Patent Practitioners (NAPP) opposed the PTO's suggestions to
address the backlog by adjusting the patent application filing rules by placing limits on claims because
the changes would "leave a large number of questions open, make adequate protection for patents
10
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1. Provisions of the Final Rules. The final rules, published in August 2007, limit
the number of claims that can be presented for initial examination in a single
application and the number of continuation applications, requests for continued
examination of applications, and continuation-in-part applications.66 Among
other significant changes, the revised rules require an applicant to file an
examination support document that covers all of the claims in an application if
the application contains more than five independent claims or more than twenty-
five total claims (known as the "5/25 rule") 7 While certainly easing the PTO's
examination burden, such changes dramatically affect applicants for U.S. patents
through increased prosecution costs and decreased patent protection.6" Some
commentators believe these rules might require applicants to reduce the scope of
claims applied for and accept inadequately narrow claims due to the limited
opportunity for presentation of claims.69
Indeed, within twenty-four hours of publication of the final rules, a
disgruntled inventor challenged the authority of the PTO in an action for a
preliminary injunction.7" During an October 31, 2007 hearing, the court issued
more difficult, yet achieve only marginal improvement in... the backlog problem." See E-mail from
NAPP, to USPTO (May 3,2006), http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/dapp/opla/comments/
fppclaims/napp.pdf (responding to request for comments regarding claims practice). For further
comments from the public, see U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, Comments Regarding Claims Practice,
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/dapp/opla/comments/ fpp-claims/claims-
comments.html (last visited Mar. 2, 2008). The USPTO responded to the flood of comments by
not expressly limiting the number of claims that would be examined in an application. Changes to
Practice for Continued Examination Filings, Patent Applications Containing Patentably Indistinct
Claims, and Examination of Claims in Patent Applications, 72 Fed. Reg. 46,716, 46,721 (to be
codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1).
6 See Changes to Practice for Continued Examination Filings, Patent Applications Containing
Patentably Indistinct Claims, and Examination of Claims in Patent Applications, 72 Fed. Reg.
at 46,716-843 (revising rules of practice in examination of claims in patent applications).
67 See id. at 46,724 ("An applicant must file an examination support document in compliance
with [37 C.F.R.] § 1.265 that covers each claim (whether in independent or dependent form) before
the issuance of a first Office action on the merits of the application if the application contains or is
amended to contain more than five independent claims or more than twenty-five total claims."). An
independent claim is completely self-contained, while a dependent claim refers back to an earlier
claim to incorporate all limitations in the previous claim and include its own limitations. CHISUM
ET AL., supra note 34, at 91.
68 See infra Part III.A-D.
69 See, e.g., Thomas, supra note 11, at 727-28 (arguing that regulations that severely limit when
continuation applications can be filed may restrict an applicant's ability to claim and defend
meritorious inventions).
7 Complaint, Tafas v. Dudas, 511 F. Supp. 2d 652 (E.D. Va. 2007) (No. 1:07cv846), 2007
WL 3359672 (alleging that the new rules are inconsistent with various provisions of the Patent Act
and with the U.S. Constitution). Tafas was consolidated with a subsequent injunction action by
GlaxoSmithKline (GSK). See Verified Amended Complaint, SmithKline Beecham Corp. v.
2008]
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an order temporarily enjoining the PTO from implementing the new rules, which
were set to become effective the next day.7 The Tafas court concluded that the
potential negative impact on the plaintiffs resulting from the implementation of
the new rules was greater than the possible problems created by the new
continuation rules since the claim rules do not absolutely limit the number of
claims allowed."
Several months later, the court granted the summary judgment motion against
the PTO and found the proposed limitations to the number of claims per patent
to be substantive changes and thus improper extensions of PTO authority.73
With respect to the final rules creating the 5/25 rule, the court noted that 35
U.S.C. § 112 "expressly permits an applicant to file 'one or more claims
particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the
applicant regards as his invention,' " and further noted that "[s]ince 1938, the
CCPA has consistently held that the Patent Act does not place any mechanical
limits on the number of claims an applicant may file."74 The PTO had argued that
the changes were only procedural and is considering an appeal.7
Previously, there was no limit on the number of claims allowed in a patent
application so long as the required excess claims fee was paid, providing an
economically coercive way to minimize large numbers of claims in an
application.76 In contrast, the disincentive under the new rules is a requirement
that an applicant wishing to file more than five independent claims or more than
twenty-five total claims will be required to file an Examination Support
Document (ESD).77 The ESD would include a statement by the applicant that a
Dudas, 511 F. Supp. 2d 652 (E.D. Va. 2007) (No. 1:07cv1008), 2007 WL 3231881. The action was
supported by numerous amicus curiae briefs. See, e.g., Brief of American Intellectual Property Law
Association as Amici Curiae Supporting Plaintiffs, Tafas, 511 F. Supp. 2d 652 (No. 1:07cv846)
(focusing on irreparable harm caused by the retroactive impact of applying the new rules to pending
patent applications and lack of adverse impact to PTO if implementation is delayed).
"' Tafas, 511 F. Supp. 2d at 658, 671.
72 See id at 665-66 (finding that there is a strong likelihood of success on the rules governing
continuations of patent applications, but not on the claims rule issue); Changes to Practice for
Continued Examination Filings, Patent Applications Containing Patentably Indistinct Claims, and
Examination of Claims in Patent Applications, 72 Fed. Reg. 46,716, 46,724 (to be codified at 37
C.F.R. pt. 1) (discussing how the new 34 C.F.R. S 1.75(b) requires a prior art search and reference
list be filed if the claim count exceeds the 5/25 limit).
" Tafas v. Dudas, No. 1:07cv846 0CC), 2008 WL 859467 (E.D. Va. 2008).
74 Id.
71 Zusha Elinson, Judge Strikes Down Patent Office's New Rues, DAILY REPORT, Apr. 4, 2008, at 1.
76 SeeMANUALOFPATENTEXAMINING PROCEDURE § 714.10 (8th ed., rev. 6,2007) ('Applicant
is required to pay excess claims fees for each claim that is in excess of 3 in independent form or in
excess of 20 (whether dependent or independent).").
7 Changes to Practice for Continued Examination Filings, Patent Applications Containing
Patentably Indistinct Claims, and Examination of Claims in Patent Applications, 72 Fed. Reg.
[Vol. 15:343
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pre-examination search was conducted and a listing of pertinent references
resulting from the search." The rule would not only apply to applications filed
on or after the effective date of the rule, but would also be retroactive and include
any application that is pending but has not received an examination. 9 These
additional disclosure requirements will significantly increase the costs associated
with claiming more than the 5/25 threshold number.
80
Additionally, the ESD process exposes applicants to increased inequitable
conduct liability.8' Inequitable conduct allegations arise from an applicant's
intentional misrepresentation of a material fact or failure to disclose material
information in his or her patent application. 2 Such allegations may cause the
resulting patent to be declared unenforceable.83 The ESD requires an applicant
to make a series of affirmative representations regarding his or her search of prior
art that is likely to have a direct bearing on whether an examiner is convinced that
the claims are patentable.' However, the PTO fails to define the scope of that
at 46,724.
78 Id. at 46,741. The ESD would also identify all claim limitations disclosed in the prior art and
particularly point out how each claim is patentable over the cited references. Id. at 46,741-72. An
applicant may, without an ESD or justification, "present up to fifteen independent claims and
seventy-five total claims to a single patentably distinct invention via an initial application and two
continuation or continuation-in-part applications that are filed and prosecuted serially .... Id.
at 46,721. For an explanation of continuation applications, see MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING
PROCEDURE § 201.07 (8th ed., rev. 5, 2006) ("A continuation is a second application for the same
invention claimed in a prior nonprovisional application and filed before the original prior application
becomes abandoned or patented."); id § 201.08 ("A continuation-in-part is an application filed
during the lifetime of an earlier nonprovisional application, repeating some substantial portion or all
of the earlier nonprovisional application and addingmaternotdisdosedin the said earlier nonprovisional
application.').
" Changes to Practice for Continued Examination Filings, Patent Applications Containing
Patentably Indistinct Claims, and Examination of Claims in Patent Applications, 72 Fed. Reg.
at 46,716.
80 See ICF INTERNATIONAL, CERTIFICATION ANALYSIS UNDER THE REGULATORY FLEXIBILITY
ACT: CHANGES TO PRACTICE FOR CONTINUED EXAMINATION FILINGS, PATENT APPLICATIONS
CONTAINING PATENTABLY INDISTINCT CLAIMS, AND EXAMINATION OF CLAIMS IN PATENT
APPLICATIONS 16 (June 29,2007), avaiableaathttp://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/dapp/opla/
presentation/ccfrcertificationanalysis.pdf (noting that the patent search required by the ESD alone
would cost between $1,000 and $2,500).
8" Jeffrey G. Sheldon, Ethical Ob,'gations of Patent Practitioners: Do You Know the Ruks?, 923 P.L.I.
PAT. COPYRIGHTS,TRADEMARKS, AND LITERARY PROPERTY COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 513, 521
(2008).
82 SCHECHTER& THOMAS, supra note 12, § 7.7.1, at 258.
83 Id.
' See Changes to Practice for Continued Examination Filings, Patent Applications Containing
Patentably Indistinct Claims, and Examination of Claims in Patent Applications, 72 Fed. Reg.
at 46,741-44 (explaining the ESD requirements).
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search.5 Thus, the resulting potential for a practitioner to be accused of
inequitable conduct could cause the applicant to behave in a manner so as to
avoid the necessity of filing an ESD. 6
2. Policy Behind the Changes. According to the PTO, the recent changes to the
patent application system will allow the office to conduct a more thorough and
reliable examination of patent applications.87 The idea is that the ESD will assist
the examiner in determining patentability by providing the most relevant prior art
before actually conducting a prior art search,"8 thus dividing the responsibility for
patent quality between applicants and the PTO.89 The reactions to the new rules
have been mixed, though most commentary suggests that the rules will impede
the ability of applicants to procure comprehensive patent protection and
substantially increase filing costs.
90
The PTO's main goals for the recent rule changes, increasing patent office
efficiency and decreasing the application backlog,9 are based on the belief that
pendency times for a patent application are highly correlated with the number of
85 See Tafas v. Dudas, 511 F. Supp. 2d 652, 667 (E.D. Va. 2007) ("[According to plaintiff GSK,]
the 'rule does not indicate whether the applicant must conduct electronic searches, manual searches,
or both; in which countries' databases the applicant must search; or which libraries it must search.').
s See id. at 668 (acknowledging the difficulty a "reasonably prudent person" would encounter
in complying with the ESD requirements). In a 2006 symposium, PTO representatives
acknowledged that the ESD practice involves submissions which "in the current law of inequitable
conduct, nobody's going to want to do." Letter from David E. Boundy, Vice President, Cantor
Fitzgerald L.P., to Steven S. McMillin, Deputy Director, U.S. Office of Management and Budget,
at 4 & n.10 (July 3,2007), availab4-athttp://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/oira/0651 /comments/461.
pdf (on file with author) (referring to recorded web video of Duke University Law School's Fifth
Annual Hot Topics in Intellectual Property Law Symposium).
" See Defendant's Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order and
Preliminary Injunction, Tafas v. Dudas, 511 F. Supp. 2d 652 (E.D. Va. 2007) (No. 1:07cv846), 2007
WIL 3231880 [hereinafter PTO GSK Opposition] (describing PTO goal to "increase application quality,
reduce the backlog, and improve examination efficiency").
18 Changes to Practice for Continued Examination Filings, Patent Applications Containing
Patentably Indistinct Claims, and Examination of Claims in Patent Applications, 72 Fed. Reg.
at 46,721.
89 U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, Measure to Improve Patent .Quai y and Reduce Pendeng
(Aug. 20, 2007), http://www.uspto.gov/main/homepagenews/bak2007aug20.htn.
'o While some responses have been as vehement as "It is time for Patent Counsel to rally the
troops, grab the pitchforks, and head for the sands of battle .. in the Eastern District of Virginia,"
Posting ofJohn White to PLI Patent Blog, http://www.pli.edu/patentcenter/blog.aspview=plink
&id= 119 (Oct. 17, 2007, 16:38 EST), most responses have been more sedate. Seegeneralb Comments
Regarding Caims Practice, supra note 65 (collecting public comments submitted to the PTO regarding
the proposed claim designation rule).
9' See Changes to Practice for the Examination of Claims in Patent Applications, 71 Fed.
Reg. 61, 62 (Jan. 3, 2006) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1) ("The Office's current practice for
examination of claims in patent applications is less efficient than it could be because it requires an
initial p tentability examination of every claim in an application.').
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claims and prior art references contained in the application. Despite
acknowledging that the initial examination of large numbers of claims may
sometimes be necessary in certain applications, the PTO believed that excessive
claims required a disproportionate amount of the already limited time available to
review applications. 93 While over 40% of new applications in the 2004 fiscal year
had more than twenty claims,94 only 1.2% of all nonprovisional applications in
2005 included more than ten independent claims.95 Based on this data, the PTO
concluded the rule changes would allow for the examination of every independent
claim in 98.8% of the applications filed without any additional effort by the
applicant.96
D. EFFECT OF CLAIM NUMBER ON PATENT VALUE AND IMPORTANCE
A policy analysis should emphasize more important patents, which are
identified through their inherent value.97 Hypothetical measures of patent value
include the number of claims in an application, number of citations made to other
patents, "citations received" through references made by subsequent patents to
the patent at issue, number of continuation applications filed, and whether the
patent was ultimately litigated.9 The average number of claims is a strong
indicator of patent value for three primary reasons. First, because multi-claim
patents are costly to file because of increased filing fees99 and attorney's fees, the
number of claims in an application can be an indicator of patent value."°° Second,
given the high cost of litigation, patents which are litigated are also typically
considered valuable patents." 1 Thus, the correlation between number of claims
and litigation implies that claim number is a strong predictor of a patent's value.
10 2
92 John R. Allison et al., Valuable Patents, 92 GEO. L.J. 435, 438-39, 448-51, 459 (2004).
9 U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, Proposed Ruk Changes to Focus the Patent Process in the 21st
Century, http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/dapp/opla/presentation/focuspp.html (last visited
May 18, 2008).
94id
9' Changes to Practice for the Examination of Claims in Patent Applications, 71 Fed. Reg. at 62,66.
96 Id. at 62.
17 See Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 Nw. U. L. REv. 1495, 1508-11
(2001) (arguing that an effective patent system focuses its resources on valuable patents rather than
"bad patents").
9' See John R. Allison et al., supra note 92, at 448-56 (examining the key characteristics of
litigated patents as indicators of patent value).
99 Under the old rules, an applicant who wished to file more than twenty claims or more than
three independent claims had to pay an additional fee per claim. 37 C.F.R. § 1.16(h)-(i) (2007).
" Allison & Lemley, supra note 46, at 104.
101 Allison et al., supra note 92, at 441.
102 SeeJohn R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Who's Patenting What?An EmpiricalExploration ofPatent
2008]
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Litigated patents include significantly more claims than non-litigated patents: an
average of 13.2 claims for the latter patents and 19.8 claims for the former.
10 3
Third, higher patent maintenance rates correspond to higher patent values.'0
4
Obtaining a patent is a costly process.' Most expenses associated with a patent
are incurred during the prosecution process through attorney and filing fees, with
estimates ranging from $10,000 to $30,000 per patent 06 The incredible expense
of acquiring a patent does not end with issuance, as maintenance fees must be
paid throughout the life of the patent.0 7 To prevent expiration of a patent, a
patentee must pay $900 three and a half years after issuance, $2,300 seven and a
half years after issuance, and $3,800 eleven and a half years after issuance.I° 8 In
deciding whether to maintain a patent and incur the substantial costs of patent
maintenance, the number of claims in the patent plays a significant role, as the
patent maintenance fee generally increases with the number of claims. 109 Studies
of patents have shown that a patent with a higher number of independent claims
Prosecution, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2099, 2132 (2000) ("The number of claims filed is directly related to
the cost of prosecution, and can serve as a proxy for either complexity of the subject matter or for
the importance of the patent to the applicant."). Some commentators have said that the average
number of claims and other such characteristics are poor predictors of whether a patent is likely to
be litigated. See David E. Adelman & Kathryn L. DeAngelis, Patent Metrics: The Mismeasure of
Innovation in the Biotech Patent Debate, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1677, 1722 (2007) (rejecting patent
characteristics as value predictors based on weak statistical significance). However, these claims have
been rebutted by other scholars. SeeJohn R. Allison & Thomas W. Sager, Valuable Patents Redux: On
the Enduring Merit of Using Patent Characteistics to Identifi Valuable Patents, 85 TEX. L. REv. 1769, 1794
(2007) (describing Adelman and DeAngelis's criticisms as "substantially misplaced').
103 Allison, supra note 92, at 451.
104 Jonathan A. Bamey,A Study ofPatent Mortaio Rates: Using Statistical SurvivalAna~sis to Rate and
Value Patent Assets, 30 AIPLA Q.J. 317, 331 (2002).
105 Lemley, supra note 97, at 1498.
106 Id. at 1498-99 (reviewing prosecution cost estimates).
107 See MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2520 (8th ed., rev. 6, 2007) (explaining
patent practitioner maintenance fee procedure).
108 37 C.F.R. § 1.20(e)-(g) (2007). These fee values do not apply to design, plant, or small entity
patents. Id. The maintenance fees required by the USPTO were increased by approximately 3% in
September 2007 to reflect fluctuations in the Consumer Price Index. See 35 U.S.C. S 41 () (2002);
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, Fee ModernizationAct of 2003: Putpose andNeedforProposedStatutory
Changes to 35 U.S.C 4 I-Fees, available athttp://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/strat2l /feepur
pose.htm (last visited Feb. 26, 2008) (stating the thirty-nine fee increase is recommended by the PTO
to "ensure that there is no delay in the implementation of the USPTO's new initiatives aimed at
improving the quality of granted patents and trademark registrations, increasing efficiency through
e-Government programs, and reducing pendency in processing applications for patents and for the
registration of trademarks').
109 Barney, supra note 104, at 332.
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is worth more to its owner by providing comprehensive protection of the
invention and proof of validity in the litigation context.'
The number of claims in a patent relates not only to the intrinsic value of the
patent but also both to the relevant industry for the patent and to the
characteristics of the applicant. Typically, "[the number of] claims [in a patent]
are positively correlated with the applicants' cash flow and capital intensity."'
Individuals file fewer claims than any entity, and non-profits file the most claims
(though this statistic is suspect due to the low number of non-profit patents
analyzed)." 2  The number of claims also differs across technology areas." 3
Accordingly, industries with high total claims per application were medical devices
(17.05), pharmaceutical (14.99), and biotechnology (13.30).114 United States-based
inventors are strongly represented in the medical device, pharmaceutical, and
biotechnology fields in comparison to inventors from other countries."' Thus,
the number of claims in an application can indicate a later issuing patent's
economic value.
III. ANALYSIS
If the CEO of Wlalmart was troubled by the success of his company, the
inabiliy of his company to handle the multitude of customers, and the inabiit
to ipend all of the money he was making I don't think that he wouldput a sign
in the fornt [sic] window of every Walmart stating: 'Effective November 1st
we will only be selling brooms. 16
As described in Part II.D, the PTO's claim limitation rules have a significant
impact on the behavior of applicants who are pursuing patent protection. This
Part describes the practical and economic effects of these strategic changes in
applicant behavior that disparately impact sectors especially important to the U.S.
economy. This Part concludes with reasonable solutions that, if adopted by the
PTO, may avoid such negative effects.
110 Id.
n" James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, Lessons for Patent Poh"9 From Empirical Research on Patent
Litigation, 9 LEwis & CLARK L. REv. 1, 21 (2005).
12 Allison & Lemley, supra note 102, at 2145 & n.131, 2174.
113 Id. at 2131-32.
114 Id at 2161.
s Id at 2121-24.
16 Posting of Anon to Patently-O Blog, http://www.patendyo.com/patent/2007/08/dr-tafas-
files-.html (Aug. 23, 2007, 10:53 EST).
20081
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A. APPROPRIATE APPROACH OR ABUSE OF AUTHORITY: A PRACTICAL AND
STRATEGIC ANALYSIS
Although the PTO has argued that the proposed rules discussed in Part II.C.
do not present an absolute bar to the presentation of claims, the practical effect
is that applicants wishing to pursue these options face significant and burdensome
obstacles. It is expressly the PTO's duty, not the duty of applicants, to examine
applications and discover prior art."' By requiring an ESD, the PTO has
impermissibly shifted the burden of discovering relevant prior art to the applicant.
The ESD option is not only expensive but also provides statements on the record
that can potentially be used by an accused infringer for both invalidity and
inequitable conduct defenses."
8
Additionally, the PTO rationale that five independent claims provide sufficient
protection for the majority of applicants119 fails to consider that complete patent
protection is achieved through liberal allowance of dependent claims, which
incorporate every limitation of an independent claim with further limitation.
2 °
Patent applicants probably will not feel confident that the examiner will find
allowable subject matter by reviewing a limited number of initial claims. Scholars
have noted that from the PTO's viewpoint, an advantage of dependent claims is
that they require less time to examine, and applicants using them should be given
a financial incentive for doing so.12'
117 See 35 U.S.C. § 131 (2002) ("The Director shall cause an examination to be made of the
application and the alleged new invention. . ").
"' See Changes to Practice for Continued Examination Filings, Patent Applications Containing
Patentably Indistinct Claims, and Examination of Claims in Patent Applications, 72 Fed.
Reg. 46,716, 46,725 (Aug. 21, 2007) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1). The new rules, specifically
§ 1.75(b)(4), establish a process where two applications with patentably indistinct claims will be
treated together, which would restrict applicants to ten selected claims for purposes of determining
whether ESD is required. Changes to Practice for Continued Examination Filings, Patent
Applications Containing Patentably Indistinct Claims, and Examination of Claims in Patent
Applications, 72 Fed. Reg. at 46,725.
19 See id at 46,788 (explaining why the PTO believes that the rule requiring an applicant to file
an ESD if his or her application contains more than five independent claims will not have a
substantial negative impact on individual and small entity investors seeking patent protection).
120 See FABER, supra note 28, §§ 2.9-2.10 (recommending that patent applicants draft broader
independent claims which include all of the necessary limitations, and then specifically claim the
various embodiments of the invention through individual claims). But see SHELDON, supra note 27,
§ 6.5.8.1 (recommending that new practitioners draft parent independent claims to have no more
than five dependent claims).
121 FABER, supra note 28, § 2:9 ("Note that, when any claim is allowed, all dependent claims,
which are dependent on the allowed claim can also be allowed without further examination for
novelty or obviousness, other than to make sure they are dependent daims and satisfy 35 U.S.C. 5
112.").
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Ultimately, the new patent application rules may even increase examination
burdens on the PTO. Under the proposed rules, practitioners are forced to
concurrently file separate applications in order to claim all embodiments of their
invention.'2 This policy could increase the PTO's workload if more than one
examiner needs to become familiar with the same subject matter. The increased
workload created by the proposed rules will offset or eliminate any backlog
reduction.'23 The PTO should not pass a rule for the purpose of reducing its
workload, especially a rule that limits the actual function of the PTO: managing
the patent registration system for the American public.
B. APPROPRIATE APPROACH OR ABUSE OF AUTHORITY: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
In addition to the basic costs imposed on patent applicants in acquiring
Patents,124 many of the proposed rule changes would impose significant new
financial burdens on both the applicants'25 and the PTO itself. First, the rule
changes may create substantial budget issues for the PTO because the intended
reduction in patent applications translates directly to revenue loss. 126 The claim
limitations will reduce the largest factor in determining patent maintenance fees:
the number of claims. 2 7 Maintenance fees are over three-fourths of the total fees
generated by a patent and require minimal administrative costs from the PTO.121
The incremental revenue for claims comes at a relatively low examination cost for
the PTO; claims in a single application are necessarily closely related,'29 and
therefore, the examination burden for claims in an application increases at a lesser
rate than the increase in fees collected from those additional claims. 30 Thus, the
"2 See Brenda Sandburg, PTO Proposed Rue Could Force Drug Firms to Fik More Patent Appications,
THE PINK SHEET, Aug. 21, 2007, available at http://www.fdalegislativewatch.com/2007/08/pto-
proposed-ru.html.
123 Even further, the PTO has already spent more then 25,000 hours preparing its employees for
the implementation of the final rules. See PTO GSK Opposition, supra note 87, at 18 (detailing PTO
preparation before the November 1, 2007 implementation of the rules).
124 See supra notes 105-08 and accompanying text.
125 A recent study prepared for the PTO estimated the final claims rules will result in incremental
costs ranging from $872 to $13,993 per application. ICF REPORT, supra note 80, at 25.
126 Boundy, supra note 86, at 3-5. See also American Bar Association, Section of Intellectual
Property Law Report to the House of Delegates, available at http://www.abanet.org/intelprop/1061
egis/ptouserfee.doc (discussing PTO budgetary issues and the effects of decreased PTO revenue).
"a Boundy, supra note 86, at 4-5.
128 Id.
129 See 37 C.F.R. § 1.141(a) (2007) ("Two or more independent and distinct inventions may not
be claimed in one national application ......
" The PTO charges a fixed $310 fee for applications filed with twenty-claims or fewer, and each
additional claim is $50. United States Patent and Trademark Office, FY 2008 Fee Schedule, effective
Sept. 30,2007, availableathttp://www.uspto.gov/go/fees/fee2007september3O.htm#patapp. Fees
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applications that would be curbed by the new claim rules are among the more
profitable ones for the PTO.
Second, the new rules are likely to significantly increase the cost of patent
prosecution to the applicant. If the proposed rules are implemented by the PTO,
in addition to increasing the immediate costs of reviewing all pending
applications,' the costs of prosecuting applications are also likely to significantly
rise.132 In the past, only 1,255 applicants, about half of a percent of all applicants,
took advantage of accelerated examination by filing ESD-type documents. 33 If
applicants are historically averse to filing such documents, requiring an ESD will
certainly impact applicant patterns under the new rules. The PTO estimates the
cost of preparing an ESD at $2,500,134 but ESDs are more difficult to prepare
than novelty opinions. 35 Unlike the traditionally obtained preliminary novelty
opinions, which recite the scope of a prior art search and pertinent items found,
136
the pre-application prior art search required by the ESD procedure would cost
between $8,000 and $10,000 for each wider ranging search. 31 Cost estimates for
the more complex ESD range from $6,000 to $15,500 per application. 13  The
are cut in half for small entities. See id.
131 See Declaration of David Kappos, on Behalf of IBM, in Support of the AIPLA Amicus Brief,
Tafas v. Dudas, 511 F.Supp.2d 652 (E.D. Va. Aug. 22,2007) (arguing against retroactive application
of the new rules due to the incredible cost IBM will incur to review over 25,000 pending patent
applications to ensure compliance). Notably, IBM, like many information technology companies,
has been a strong supporter of "patent reform," including the new rules. Letter from Manny W.
Schecter, IBM Associate General Counsel, to USPTO (May 3,2006), available athttp://www.uspto.
gov/web/offices/pac/dapp/opla/comments/fpp-claims/ibm.pdf.
132 The new rules will impose costs for reviewing all pending applications and require higher
attorney fees for ESD preparation, in many cases. See ICF REPORT, supra note 80, at 16-18
(discussing monetary cost of the proposed rules).
133 Changes to Practice for the Examination of Claims in Patent Applications, 71 Fed. Reg. 61, 63
(Jan. 3, 2006).
134 See id. at 66 (citing an AIPLA study of the seventy-fifth percentile charge of a patent novelty
search, analysis, and opinion).
135 See E-mail from Steven M. Hoffberg, Dep't of Commerce, to USPTO (May 1, 2006),
availableathttp://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/dapp/opla/comments/f -laims/hoffberg.
pdf (arguing that the PTO's $2,500 ESD estimate underestimates the true cost for obtaining an
ESD).
136 LEGAL OPINION LETIERS: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO OPINION LETTER PRACTICE
§ 9.10 (M. John Sterba ed., 3d ed. 2003).
137 See Lemley, supra note 97, at 1510 (estimating cost of prior art searches based on actual search
costs and increased legal fees from increased disclosure of prior art).
135 See Letter from NAPP, to USPTO, supra note 65, at 11-12 (estimating ESD cost based on
forty hours of work at $150 per hour); Letter from William B. Slate, to USPTO, at 11 (May 3, 2006),
available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/dapp/opla/comments/fpp-claims/b-l.pdf
(estimating ESD cost based on $18,000 cost of "Validity/Invalidity Only Opinion" minus the $2,500
if all novelty search work can be applied to the ESD).
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decision to select fewer claims or prepare an ESD requires a good knowledge of
prior art. While conducting a pre-filing prior art search is good practice, 39 the
timing and extent of searching ought to be decided by applicants.
C. DISPARATE IMPACT ON AREAS UNIQUELY VITAL TO THE AMERICAN ECONOMY
Search costs and higher application fees created by the rules changes will fall
disproportionately on individuals and small businesses,"4 which have a significant
impact on American innovation and progress. 4' Large corporations can adapt by
filing more applications because they already file a large number of applications,
each addressing very narrow inventions arising from a common commercial
invention. 42 Individuals and small businesses do not have that luxury because
they do not have enough resources to engage in such tactics.'43 Even though the
PTO attempted to reduce the burden on small entities in regards to the new claim
rules,'" the estimated cost of an ESD for a small entity still looks to be in the
range of $2,563 to $13,121 .4
139 See Graham v.John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 36 (1966) (describing prior art search as "a prudent
and nowadays common preliminary to well organized research").
14o See infra pp. 363-65. However, only 0.04% of the total affected applications will be from small
entities. ICF REPORT, supra note 80, at 28. Specifically, the claims requirements are predicted to
affect only 0.44-0.54% of small entity initial applications. Id at 26.
141 Independent inventors are responsible for many of the most important inventions of the last
century: "atomic energy, penicillin, microwave technology, the FM radio, magnetic recording,
holography, fiber optics, and insulin." H.R. REP. No. 102-382, at 32 n.31 (1991), as reprinted in 1991
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1320, 1328.
142 See general Patent Law andNon-profit Research Collaboration: Heating Before the Subcomm. on Courts,
the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the Juediay, 107th Cong. 57 (2002) (statement of
Jon D. Grossman) ("In fact, it is common for large corporations to have a steady stream of new
patents issue in their respective patent portfolios.').
143 Seegeneral Jeff A. Ronspies, Does Datid Need a New Shng? Small Entities Face a Cost# Baer to
Patent Protection, 4 J. MARSHALL REv. INTELL. PROP. L. 184, 195-204 (2004) (discussing how the
economic disparity between small entities and large corporations may lead individual and small entity
inventors to believe the cost of patent protection far exceeds the profits expected).
44 Small entities are exempt from identifying all of the limitations of the claims disclosed by each
reference in the ESD. See Changes to Practice for Continued Examination Filings, Patent
Applications Containing Patentably Indistinct Claims, and Examination of Claims in Patent
Applications, 72 Fed. Reg. 46,716,46,743 (Aug. 21, 2007) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1) (allowing
a small entity to claim an exemption from the requirement in 37 C.F.R. § 1.265(a)(3) for an
identification of all of the limitations of each of the claims that are disclosed by the references cited
in the listing of the references).
145 Changes to Practice for Continued Examination Filings, Patent Applications Containing
Patentably Indistinct Claims, and Examination of Claims in Patent Applications, 72 Fed. Reg. at
46,798.
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The new rules will not only reduce the scope of patent protection available to
technology companies (which traditionally rely on numerous claims for full
protection), but independent inventors and small entities will also be less likely to
file based on their limited financial resources. 146  Thus, the rules will
disproportionately impact inventions especially vital to the national economy.
14
Even if the actual percentage of applications affected is small, the damage would
be more significant because it targets the inventions that need the most careful
patent protection.
Moreover, limiting the ability to claim complex inventions will fall
disproportionately on pharmaceutical and software companies. The
pharmaceutical industry is concerned about PTO policies that inhibit their ability
to fully protect their discoveries. 48 The Senior Vice President of Pharmaceutical
Research and Manufacturers of America, Ken Johnson, said in a statement
regarding the patent changes that "what makes this a serious issue is the fact [that]
adequate patent protection is the lifeblood behind development of new
treatments" at a time when it can take over a decade to develop a drug at great
cost to the industry.
149
D. ALTERNATIVES TO THE NEW CLAIM RULES
There has been extensive discussion about how to reform the U.S. patent
system, leading to an overwhelming number of potential solutions.'s In addition
to rule changes limiting continuations and number of claims in an application, the
PTO has proposed further examination reform through "accelerated
examination" procedures,' an online peer review pilot program to improve
' Mack, supra note 40, at 2148-49.
147 See CALIFORNIA HEALTHCARE INSTITUTE, IMPACT OF PATENT LAW CHANGES ON
BIOMEDICALINVESTMENTAND INNOVATION 4-6 (2007), availableathttp://www.chi.org/industry/
reports.aspx (follow hyperlink under "2007 CHI Reports") ("As proposed, the rules would have a
devastating effect on mid-sized and start-up biotechnology, pharmaceutical, and medical technology
companies.'); BIOTECHNOLOGY INDUSTRY ORGANIZATION,THE ECONOMIC CONTRIBUTIONS OF
THE BIOTECHNOLOGY INDUSTRY TO THE U.S. ECONOMY (2000), available at http://www.bio.org/
speeches/pubs/emstyoung.pdf
145 See Katrina Megget, Patent Changes and the Pharma lndustrJ, IN-PHARMATECHNOLOGIST.COM,
Aug. 30, 2007, http://www.in-pharmatechnologist.com/news/ng.asp?id=79375 (discussing how
pharmaceutical companies must find strategics to deal with the changes in the patent rules).
149 See id. (estimating an average cost of $1 billion to develop a new drug).
See Matthew Sag & Kurt Rohde, Patent Reform and Differential Impact, 8 MINN. J.L. SCI. &
TECH. 1, 51-76 (2007) (surveying patent reform proposals under consideration by Congress).
151 See Changes to Practice for Petitions in Patent Applications To Make Special and for
Accelerated Examination, 71 Fed. Reg. 36,323, 36,324 (June 26, 2006) ('The USPTO is revising its
procedures for applications made special under the accelerated examination program with the goal
[Vol. 15:343
22
Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 15, Iss. 2 [2008], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol15/iss2/4
2008] BAD MEDICINE
access to available prior art," 2 and Information Disclosure Statement procedure
changes to encourage new applicants to provide the most relevant information in
early stages of the patent application review process.' 3 These changes are meant
to work "synergistically" with the final rules.'54 Yet, the PTO seems to be taking
a fairly statistical approach to fixing its problems instead of looking aggregately
at what would make a patent application examination more efficient.
The rules changes proposed by the PTO are unnecessary when something as
simple as increasing fees has an impact on the number of applications filed and
the number of claims filed per application.'55 Further increasing excess claim fees
would lead to more applicants voluntarily decreasing the number of claims
presented. This would allow the PTO to improve its application backlog without
adopting new rules that will likely limit the ability of applicants to properly protect
their inventions. Another option is fully funding the PTO. Although legislation
is being considered to allow the PTO to keep all its revenue,5 6 the PTO should
lobby Congress to get more revenue than it collects to offset the losses from past
years.5 7 The increased revenue would allow the PTO to continue workforce
expansion' 5 8 and improve workforce attrition.'
59
of completing examination within twelve months of the filing date of the application.').
152 SeeJohnJ. Doll, Pilot Concerning Public Submission of PeerReviewed PriorArt, OFFICIAL GAZETTE
OF THE UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE: PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
NOTICES (June 26,2007), availabkathttp://www.uspto.gov/web/patents/patog/week26/OG/TO
C.htm#refl2 (discussing the feasibility of "collaborative, online process in which members of the
public pool together their knowledge and locate potential prior art").
153 See Changes to Information Disclosure Statement Requirements and Other Related
Matters, 71 Fed. Reg. 38,808 (July 10, 2006) (discussing proposed changes to the patent filing rules
to make special procedures to require preexamination search of prior art).
154 PTO GSK Opposition, supra note 87, at 20.
155 See supra Part II.D.
154 FinalJudiciary Comm. Report to Accompany S. 1145, A Bill to Amend Tide 35, United States
Code, to Provide for Patent Reform, 110th Cong. 34-35 (2008), available at http://www.ipo.org
(follow "Law, Policy, and Advocacy" hyperlink; then follow "Legislative Action Center" hyperlink;
then follow "Patent Reform" hyperlink) (discussing end of PTO fee diversion in section 15).
,s7 See A REPORT BY A PANEL OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION FOR
THE U.S. CONGRESS AND THE U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE: US PATENT AND
TRADEMARK OFFICE: TRANSFORMING TO MEET THE CHALLENGES OF THE 21ST CENTURY 40
(2005), availabk at http://www.napawash.org/Pubs/PTO8-25-05.pdf (noting that the USPTO lost
more than $741 million of its fee revenue between FY1992 and FY2004).
158 See id at 41-49 (discussing the impact of fee availability limits on USPTO staffing loads).
1s9 See Review of U.S. Patent and Trademark Office Operations Involving Anaysis of Government
Accountabiho Office, Inspector General, and NationalAcademy ofPubhcAdministration Reports: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intelkctual-Proper*y of the H. Comm. on the Judicdagy, 109th Cong. 12
(2005) (statement of Rep. Howard L. Berman, Ranking Member, Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet,
and Intellectual Property), available at http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/judiciary/hju23324.
000/hju23324_0.htm ("Only 45% of the PTO workforce has five or more years of service, and in
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Because of the variety of non-patent methods available for protecting
technology, the burden-increasing rule changes may cause some firms to pursue
alternative protection mechanisms. 60 This would be socially detrimental because
some alternate tactics do not disclose the technology to the public domain.'
Also, while the PTO dropped a 1998 proposal to absolutely limit the number of
allowed claims in a patent application in response to negative commentary, 6 ' the
implementation of the new rules might justify even more extreme rules-such as
restricting the number of applications allowed per year or further restricting
allowances to a single claim-if the backlog were to still worsen.
IV. CONCLUSION
Whether or not the claim limitation rules proposed by the PTO are finally
implemented, the significant problems present within the PTO will still burden
the already sluggish patent prosecution system. The new rule changes will make
the PTO's job easier by shifting more of the time and expense burden of
examining a patent application to the applicant. The implementation of the new
rules may result in fewer applications being filed or allowed, with narrower patent
coverage on any patents ultimately awarded. A reduction in patent filings will
ultimately have a negative effect on the American people because this will likely
lead to less innovation and disclosure of inventions to the public.
It is better to adapt the PTO procedures than to encourage inventors to file
less often.'63 Given the significance of these changes, the PTO should not adopt
new rules unless and until the Court decides the legal challenges relating to the
an agency where it takes roughly five or six years before an employee becomes fully productive, this
is a troublesome statistic.").
160 See, e.g., Sein M. Coughlin, Is the Patent Paradox a Result of a Large Firm Perspective?: Differential
Value of Small Firm Patents Over Time Explains the Patent Paradox, 23 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER &
HIGH TECH. L.J. 371, 380-81 (2007) (discussing non-patent tactics employed by large firms);
Ronspies, supra note 143, at 203-04 (discussing alternatives to costly patent process potentially used
by small entities, including trade secret protection or no protection at all).
161 See Ronspies, supra note 143, at 204 (noting that "the very nature of trade secret protection
undercuts the intent of the patent system because innovations kept as trade secrets do not readily
become available for others to build upon").
162 See Changes to Implement the Patent Business Goals, 64 Fed. Reg. 53,772, 53,774-75
(Oct. 4, 1999) (withdrawing proposal to place limits on the number of claims that will be examined
in a single application).
163 Alternatives are available despite the PTO claim that weaker rule changes would be inadequate
to achieve their backlog reduction goals. Changes to Practice for Continued Examination Filings,
Patent Applications Containing Patentably Indistinct Claims, and Examination of Claims in Patent
Applications, 72 Fed. Reg. 46,716,46,816-23,46,824-26,46,833-34 (Aug. 21, 2007) (to be codified
at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1).
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proper rulemaking authority,' or Congress acts to address the issues through the
pending patent reform legislation. Without a proposal arising from extensive
commentary from not only the PTO but also patent practitioners and attorneys,
adopting unreasonable new rules with questionable statutory authority would be
a harmful and inefficient maneuver for the U.S. patent system.
Elisabeth Marie Koehnemann
164 The aspect of the claim limitation rules that makes it less susceptible to challenge is that it
does not limit the number of continuations or claims definitively, but rather the new rules simply
force applicants making numerous claims to justify their approach and pay additional fees both to
the PTO and their practitioner.
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